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THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

BRAD LYNN MONTGOMERY,
Appellant,

)
)

v.
STATE OF UTAH,
Appellee.

Case NO. 20050945-CA
)
Priority: 2
)

APPELLANT BRIEF BRAD LYNN MONTGOMERY

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The rule or statutory authority that confers jurisdiction on the Court of Appeals to
decide the appeal is Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure Rule 3. "An appeal may be taken
from a district or juvenile Court to the appellate court from all final orders or judgments".
On or about June 20 and 21, 2005, Brad Lynn Montgomery had a jury trial and was found
guilty of distribution of, or arranging to distribute, a controlled substance, and guilty of
possession of drug paraphernalia. Judge Lynn A Payne sentenced Mr. Montgomery on
September 6, 2005.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
I. Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it did not declare a mistrial, after
the prosecutor committed prosecutorial misconduct by making inappropriate references to
inadmissible evidence in his opening statement.
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STANDARD OF REVIEW. "We look to the totality of the evidence presented at
trial in reviewing the issue of prosecutorial misconduct." State v. Stevenson, 884 P.2d
1287, 1290 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) quoting State v. Cummins, 839 P.2d 848, 852 (Utah Ct.
App. 1992). "The trial court's rulings on whether the prosecutor's conduct merits a
mistrial will not be overturned absent an abuse of discretion." State v. Fixel, 945 P.2d
149, 151 (Utah Ct. App. 1997).
II. Did the trial court err by refusing to give the Defendant's proposed jury
instruction number 2.
STANDARD OF REVIEW. "An Appeal challenging the refusal to give a
jury instruction . . . presents a question of law for which we grant no particular
deference." Summerill v. Shipley, 890 P.2d 1042 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) quoting Onglnfl
OJ.S.A) Inc. v. 11th Avenue Corp.. 850 P.2d 447, 452 (Utah 1993). "Accordingly we
'"review the trial court's instructions under a correction of error standard." Id. quoting
Ames v.Maas, 846 P.2d 468, 471 (Utah App. 1993). "Failure to give requested jury
instructions constitutes reversible error only if their omission tends to mislead the jury to
the prejudice of the complaining party or insufficiently or erroneously advises the jury on
the law." Id. quoting Biswell v. Duncan. 742 P.2d 80, 88 (Utah App. 1987).
III. Did the trial court err by allowing officer Campbell to read from his police
report that he prepared in preparation for trial?
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STANDARD OF REVIEW.
"We review evidentiary rulings for a clear abuse of discretion." State v. Morrell,
803 P.2d 292 (Utah App. 1990) citing State v. Brown. 771 P.2d 1093, 1094 (Utah Ct
App. 1989).
CITATION TO THE RECORD THAT THE ISSUE WAS PRESERVED IN THE
TRIAL COURT.
Issue I. The defendant preserved the prosecutorial misconduct in the following
manner. In chambers defendant's counsel stated, "there's - -and just to give you a brief
factual background, after this transaction, they went- or the alleged transaction, they went
and arrested Mr. Montgomery roughly half an hour later". R. 435: 139-140. "At that
time, they cuffed him, took his wallet". R. 435: 140. "Inside his wallet they found two
small plastic baggies, ziploc style that I'm sure you've seen many times, about one inch
by one inch roughly." R.435: 140. "And originally they claimed that there was some
methamphetamine residue in one of them." R. 435:140. "We demanded a lab test". R.
435: 140. "At that point, the prosecutor sent me a letter -and I've got it here- saying,
we're not going to bring up the things that were seized from Mr. Montgomery at the time
of his arrest for any purpose." R. 435: 140. "And now we've got them in their opening
statement coming up saying, he's got baggies, he had paraphernalia when they arrested
him even though - - and we've - - we were - - you know, we brought this to their
attention, and they sent us a letter saying, fine, we're not going to use that." R. 435: 140.
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"Now they used it." R. 435: 140. "And Pm - - and so Pm - - your honor, Pm moving for
a mistrial at this time based upon that. I don't think it's curable by an instruction." R.
435: 144.
Issue II. The defendant preserved his objection to not giving his instruction
number 2 in the following manner. "Well, I do. I - -1 think that our proposed instruction
number 2,1 wouldn't mind just sticking that at the end of their - - in its entirety at the end
of their credibility instruction, but I cannot in good conscience agree that he - - because
every jury form book that I've ever looked through has this thing about that felony
convictions are brought to the attention of the jury and they're told that they're - - if
someone's a felon, you should consider that for whatever it's worth." R. 435: 335.
"Well, just like, you know, we'll go ahead and do what your honor wants, and I'd just like
to note that I do object to not giving defendant's number 2 in its entirety." R. 435: 335.
Issue III. "Okay. Now, also, there was some questions about contact with the
confidential informant and contact with the strike force; Is that correct?" R. 435: 273.
"You had you some questions about a document - -" R. 435: 273. "May I approach?
Well, Actually, let me have this marked as an exhibit." R. 435: 274. "Your honor, I 'm
going to object to the introduction - -" R. 435: 274. "And can you read what you put in
that report that was referred to?" R. 435:275. "Objection, your honor. The only thing I
brought up was the second paragraph. We're gonna have to do some serious redacting."
R. 435:275.
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Later the witness read other items from a second police report. The defendant's
counsel stated, "We'd object to this portion based upon hearsay". R. 435: 218.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I. Nature of the Case
The appeal is taken from a jury verdict entered on June 21, 2005, which found the
defendant guilty of distribution of, or arranging to distribute, a controlled substance, a
first degree felony and guilty of possession of drug paraphernalia. The appeal is taken
from the entire judgment.
II. Course of Proceedings
The State of Utah filed an amended information against Mr. Montgomery charging
him with distribution of or arranging to distribute a controlled substance and possession
of drug paraphernalia. R. 42-43.
A preliminary hearing was held and Judge Payne bound the matter over for trial.
R. 52-53. A jury trial was held in the above entitled matter on June 20 and 21, 2005. R.
435 and 436. Thejury returned a verdict of guilty on the charge of distribution of or
arranging to distribute a controlled substance. R. 436: 167. Thejury returned a verdict of
guilty on the charge of possession of drug paraphernalia. R. 436: 167. On September 6,
2005, the defendant was sentenced. R. 405-407.
III. Statement of the Facts
A confidential informant Mike Collier contacted Uintah Basin Narcotics Strike
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Force officer Keith Campbell, on or about March 18, 2004, advising that he had arranged
to buy an eightball of methamphetamine for $350.00 from a person named Brad
Montgomery. R. 435: 176, 177. Officers from the Uintah Basin Narcotics Strike Force
determined that they would go through with the transaction. R. 435: 176. They obtained
money from the confidential informant fund and obtained body wire and met with Mike
Collier. R.435: 176.
The confidential informant's person and vehicle were searched. R.435: 181. A
wire was placed on the confidential informant so that the officers could listen to the
conversation. R. 435: 182-184. The defendant then left to meet Brad Montgomery. R.
435: 185. During the transaction the officers were not able to accurately record the entire
transaction, because of problems with the recording device. R. 435: 184-185, 187.
Further, the officers lost visual contact with the confidential informant, because the
informant went over a hill. R. 435: 182, 185.
The confidential informant made contact with a person that he later testified was
Brad Montgomery. R. 436: 15 - 17. Brad Montgomery made a hint that the confidential
informant should place money in the seat of the truck. R. 436: 17. The confidential
informant said, "Look here, found some money in your seat or your truck or something."
R. 436: 17. Brad Montgomery, "just pointed down and he said, what's that laying there
next to the tire?" R. 436: 18. Laying next to the wheel was a balloon. It had something
in it and it was tied up. And there was something inside of it? R. 436:18. The
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confidential informant believed the balloon contained drugs. R. 436: 18.
After retrieving the balloon, Officer Campbell drove over the top of the hill, and so
the confidential informant put the package in his pocket quickly. R. 436: 20. The
confidential informant went back to his truck and left. R. 436: 20. As the confidential
informant was leaving, Brad called the confidential informant on his cell phone and told
him, "watch out, there's all kinds of bears out there in the mountains". R. 436: 20. The
confidential informant testified that the term "bears" meant cops. R. 436: 20.
After meeting with Brad Montgomery, the confidential informant went back to the
original place where the wire was placed on him. R. 436: 21and 22. The police searched
the confidential informant and retrieved a controlled substance from him. R. 435:198
and 199. The confidential informant later testified that he gave over the package of drugs
that he had purchased to the police. R. 436: 22. The search by the police before and after
the buy were not strip searches. R. 436: 88 and 89. The police did not search the back of
the confidential informant's vehicle. R. 436: 108.
The confidential informant was in trouble with federal charges. R. 436: 4-6. And
the confidential informant would have done anything to a point to stay out of jail. R. 436:
78.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Issue I: The prosecutor committed prosecutorial misconduct when he mentioned in
his opening statement that when the defendant, Brad Montgomery, was arrested that he
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had drug paraphernalia on his person. The paraphernalia that the prosecutor made
reference to was inadmissible evidence. These remarks and the circumstances
surrounding the remarks probably influenced the jury's verdict.
Issue II: The court committed reversible error by not giving the defendant's
number 2 proposed instruction.
Issue III: The court committed reversible error by allowing officer Campbell to
testify regarding hearsay.
ARGUMENT I
In this matter there were three items of physical evidence seized by the police: (1)
methamphetamine which was the subject of the controlled buy; (2) an off-white rubber
sleeve and ziploc baggie which was the packing material for the above mentioned
methamphetamine; and (3) two baggies found in the defendant's wallet. R. 435: 143.
Items (1) and (2) were given to the police by the confidential informant as part of the
debriefing interview at the end of the controlled buy.
The police seized item (3) when the defendant was arrested. "When the defendant,
Brad Montgomery, was arrested, the police cuffed the defendant and took his wallet." R.
435: 140. Inside the defendant's wallet the police found two small plastic baggies, ziploc
style,... about one inch by one inch roughly. R. 435: 140. Originally, the police claimed
there was some methamphetamine residue in one of the baggies. R. 435: 140. The
defendant, disputing that there was any methamphetamine residue in the baggies,
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demanded a lab test. R. 435: 140. In response to the defendant's demand for a lab test of
the baggies, the prosecutor sent the defendant's attorney a letter, "saying, we're not going
to bring up the things that were seized from Mr. Montgomery at the time of his arrest for
any purpose." R. 435: 140.
Further, during the discovery process the defendant requested to know what
specific physical evidence the state would rely on in pursuing its case. The State of Utah
responded that "one, the State will rely on the off-white rubber sleeve and ziploc baggie
that contain methamphetamine which was the subject of the controlled buy." R. 435: 142
In a letter to the defendant's attorney the prosecutor stated, "The state does not
intend to use any physical evidence obtained at the time of his arrest on March 18th." R.
435: 142, lines 7-9.
The agreement made by the State of Utah and relied upon by the defendant was
that the first two items the methamphetamine and its packing material would be used as
evidence, but not the third item (the ziploc bag seized at the time of arrest). In
consideration, the defendant acquiesced on his demand to test the ziploc bag found in his
wallet. After some debate in the judges chambers, the prosecutor finally acknowledged
that this was the agreement. "Well, in my mind, I had it the other. But I have made the
agreement that I would not bring up that other evidence." R. 435: 143.
In spite of this agreement, the prosecutor, in his opening statement told the jury
about the third item of evidence seized from the defendant's wallet at the time of his
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arrest. The prosecutor stated, "later the defendant was arrested. And at that arrest, the
officers were able to execute the arrest and they found some paraphernalia on the
defendant's person consistent with methamphetamine use". R. 435: 131.
The defendant's attorney then asked for a mistrial. The defendant's attorney
explained, "you could always instruct the jury and say there was a comment made.
Disregard it. We run the risk that it'll make it even worse by bringing attention to it." R.
435: 143.
At this point, the court was not willing to grant the defendant a mistrial, stating,
"Well, I've seen these cases turn, and it may become relevant later on based upon
testimony and especially if you[r] client decides to testify, and especially if your client
testifies in certain ways. So I hate to say those facts don't exist if there's any possibility
of your testifying and - -" R. 435: 144.
In response to the prosecutor's comments made during his opening statement the
court then read the following: "Mr. Thomas has informed me that in his opening
statement, he made an error. The second charge in the information of the charge of
paraphernalia, the state relies upon to prove that charge the packaging that was located at
the time of the transfer. As I understand it, Mr. Thomas, is that your theory in this case is,
is that drugs were transferred and they were packaged in some item, and it's your theory
in this case that the paraphernalia was the packaging item with the drugs that were
transferred; is that correct?" R. 435: 162.
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"A prosecutor's questions or remarks may require reversal if: (1) the questions or
remarks called to the jury's attention matters which they would not be justified in
considering in reaching their verdict, and (2) under the circumstances, the jury was
probably influenced by the remarks." State v. Stevenson, 884 P.2d 1287, 1290 (Utah Ct.
App. 1994) citing State v. Creviston. 646 P. 2d 750, 754 (Utah 1982).
The first question is: Did the prosecutor in this matter make remarks that called to
the attention of the jury matters which they would not be justified in considering in
reaching a verdict? Yes! In the present case, the prosecutor told the jury that, "later the
defendant was arrested. And at that arrest, the officers were able to execute the arrest and
they found some paraphernalia on the defendant's person consistent with
methamphetamine use". R. 435: 131. This statement was made to the jury in spite of the
fact that the prosecutor had agreed not to use the evidence. It was clear from the
agreement between the State of Utah and the defendant that this evidence would not be
admissible to the jury.
Second, under the circumstances, was the jury probably influenced by the remark?
Yes! The concern of the defendant's trial counsel was that by instructing the jury about
the prosecutor's comments that it would make the matter worse. This is what occurred.
People learn by repetition. The prosecutor gained, first, by making a remark to the jury
that they should never have heard, and second he gained by having the judge explain his
theory of the case to the jury. This was done because the judge told the jury, "As I
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understand it, Mr. Thomas, is that your theory in this case is, is that drugs were
transferred and they were packaged in some item, and it's your theory in this case that the
paraphernalia was the packing item with the drugs that were transferred - - the alleged
drugs that were transferred; is that correct?" R. 435: 162. The remedy did as much
damage as the comments. "Courts have long recognized that a trial judge's comments
and actions carry a great deal of influence with a jury: The influence of the trial judge on
the jury is necessarily and properly of great weight and his lightest word or intimation is
received with deference, and may prove controlling. A trial judge's position before a jury
is overpowering. His position makes his slightest action of great weight with the jury".
State v. Beck, 2006 UT App 177 citing United States v. Nickl 427 F.3d 1286, 1295 (10th
Cir. 2005) (citing Ouercia v. United States. 289 U.S. 466, 470, 53 S.Ct. 698, 77 L.Ed.
1321 (1933).
ARGUMENT II
This matter involved a confidential informant. At the time of the alleged drug buy,
the confidential informant was facing federal charges. In addition, the confidential
informant had prior felony convictions. The defendant's theory of the case was that the
confidential informant set him up in order to have his charges reduced in his federal case.
Further, the defendant's theory was that the confidential informant had an opportunity to
hide drugs on his person or truck and then pull those items out and tell the drug task force
that he had received the drugs from the defendant.
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The defendant's theory was further supported by the following facts: (1) the
defendant never explicitly made reference to any drugs in his conversation with the
confidential informant, R. 435: 191 and 192; (2) the officer's never had visual contact of
the alleged dru% s&te> IL 43 5; 186; (3^ the recording equipment did not record properly, R..
435: 184; and (4) the $350.00 given to the confidential informant was never found on the
defendant's person.
Based on the defendant's theory and the supporting facts, the confidential
informant's credibility was the major issue in the trial. The defendant elicited testimony
from the confidential informant that he had a prior felony conviction. The defendant then
requested that his proposed jury instruction number 2 be included in the jury instructions.
The instruction reads,
The testimony of a witness may be discredited or impeached by showing
that the witness has been convicted of a felony, that is, of a crime
punishable by imprisonment for a term of years. A prior conviction
does not mean th£t a witness is incompetent to testify, but is merely
one circumstance that you may consider in determining the credibility
of the witness. You may decide how much weight to give any prior
conviction that was used to impeach a witness. R. 351.
The trial court refused to give the defendant's proposed jury instruction number 2.
"An Appeal challenging the refusal to give a jury instruction . . .presents a question of
law for which we grant no particular deference." Summerill v. Shipley, 890 P.2d 1042
(Utah Ct. App. 1995) quoting Ong Int'l U.S.A) Inc. v. 11th Avenue Corp., 850 P.2d 447,
452 (Utah 1993). "Accordingly we '"review the trial court's instructions under a
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correction of error standard." Id. quoting Ames v.Maas, 846 P.2d 468, 471 (Utah App.
1993). "Failure to give requested jury instructions constitutes reversible error only if their
omission tends to mislead the jury to the prejudice of the complaining party or
insufficiently or erroneously advises the jury on the law." Id. quoting Biswell v. Duncan,
742 P.2d 80, 88 (Utah App. 1987).
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 609 (a) (1) states, evidence that a witness other than
the accused has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted, subject to Rule 403, if the
crime was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year under the law
which the witness was convicted, and evidence that an accused has been convicted of
such a crime shall be admitted if the court determines that the probative value of
admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the accused."
The jury instruction requested by the defendant was consistent with Utah Rules of
Evidence, Rule 609 and thus properly represented the law. The defendant believes that
since the confidential informant's credibility was such an important part of his theory that
he was seriously prejudiced in his ability to present his case to the jury when he was not
able to present the jury instruction in its entirety to the jury.
ARGUMENT III
Hearsay is a statement, written or oral, other than one made by the declarant while
testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter
asserted. Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 801.
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Furthermore, since police reports of the factual events and details
of a criminal case are generally made for purpose of successfully
prosecuting a crime, the reasons which might otherwise provide a
basis to assume reliability of such reports as business records do
not exist where police reports are offered by the prosecution in a
criminal proceeding. State v. Bertul 664 P.2d 1181, 1184 (Utah 1983)
citing United States v. Smith. 521 F. 2d 957 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
During re-direct examination of officer Campbell, the prosecutor asked the officer
about a document that he had prepared. R. 435: 274. "You prepared a document in
relation to contacts that he had made and provided it to the defenses counsel and
prosecution". R. 435: 274.
Officer Campbell acknowledged preparing the document, and the prosecutor asked
the officer to read from the document. R. 435: 274. At this stage, the defendant's
attorney objected, because the defendant had only referred to part of the document in
cross-examination. "Objection, your honor. The only thing I brought up was the second
paragraph. We're gonna have to do some serious redacting." R. 435: 275. The court
then allowed the officer to read the document over the defendant's objection.
In this matter, the document which the defendant objected to was made by officer
Campbell, in order to prosecute a case against the defendant. It was not a business record
nor was it reliable for the reasons set forth in State v. Bertul, Id-
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above the defendant requests that this matter be reversed and
remanded for a new trial.
DATED this mth

day of July 2006.

Bryari Sidwell
Attorney for Appellant
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ADDENDUM
Defendant's proposed jury instruction number 2
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R. 335-354.

INSTRUCTION NO.

}••••

The testimony of a witness may be discredited or impeached by showing that the
witness has been convicted of a felony, that is, of a crime punishable by imprisonment for
a tetm of years, A prior conviction does not mean that a witness is incompetent to testify,
but is merely one circumstance that you may consider in determining the credibility of the
witness, You may decide how much weight to give any prior conviction that was used to
impeach a witness.

s
10th Cir. Model Inst. 1.12
IMPEACHMENT BY PRIOR CONVICTION
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